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Abstract: We analyse the eciency eects of the initial permit allocation given to 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with market power in both permit and output market. We examine two models: a long-
run model with endogenous technology and capacity choice, and a short-run model with
xed technology and capacity. In the long run, quantity pre-commitment with Bertrand
competition can yield Cournot outcomes also under emissions trading. In the short run,
Bertrand output competition reproduces the eects derived under Cournot competition,
but displays higher pass-through pro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Prices reect scarcity in well-functioning markets. In its rst trading phase 2005-2007,
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) seemed to struggle with this
principle. Following the information release that the market was long, the price of EU
Allowances (EUA) after a rst sharp fall began to rise again, and stayed in a range of
e15{18 for a period of 6 months (Alberola et al. 2008).1 During this period, it was
disconnected from almost all market fundamentals. Studies, implicitly assuming that all
of the 11,000 covered installations were actively trading, did not nd evidence of market
power (e.g., Convery and Redmond 2007, Trotignon and Delbosc 2008).2 But only a few
companies and sectors (mainly electric utilities, banks, and some hedge funds) were active
in the market in the early years. With regard to the initial allocation only the power
sector was short in the rst trading period (Ellerman and Buchner 2008). In addition,
this sector can pass-through the costs to consumers generating so-called wind-fall prots.3
We seek to explain a positive allowance price, starting from the possibility of an
overall excess permit allocation received for free in a situation where two or more rms
have market power in both permit and product market and trade permits. We examine
two kinds of models with permit/product market interaction. In our long-run models,
the choices of production technology and production capacity are endogenous, technology
choice determines the marginal cost of output production and the level of emissions per
unit of production. In the short-run model, technology and capacity are exogenous and
thus xed.
Our modeling is inspired by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). We modify their frame-
work in two ways. For the long-run analysis, we introduce, following von der Fehr (1993),
an additional initial stage of technology choice and a stage of permit choice. Hence, if
1The EUA spot price, from a high of almost e30 in late April 2006, plummeted 54% in only four days
before unexpectedly rebounding and holding in the mentioned range from April-October 2006. Then it
declined reaching some cents in 2007.
2They determine the market concentration (Herndahl-Hirschman Index) for companies and single
sectors, comparing the initial allowance allocation to the total number of permits initially allocated.
3Windfall prots accrue to a rm, when it receives inputs (such as permits) for free but incorpo-
rates their opportunity cost in its pricing decisions. Sijm et al. (2006) estimate for Germany and the
Netherlands in 2005 a pass-through rate of 60-100% with windfall prots of about e6 Bn.
2the permit market is interpreted as an input market, our analysis can be considered as
a particular case of market-making oligopoly, in the sense of Loertscher (2008).4 In the
short-run analysis, we x technology and capacity choices, and focus on the case of price
competition in the product market. We thus complement the typical analysis in the liter-
ature on market power in emissions markets and related product markets by consideration
of the case of Bertrand output oligopoly. Given that in many non-competitive product
markets rms compete in prices rather than quantities (e.g., Loertscher 2008), and that,
in particular, for electricity markets Cournot competition is typically found to deliver
too few competitive results, the almost exclusive focus on Cournot output competition
in this literature seems rather surprising.5
The distinction between long run and short run is motivated from the dierent degrees
of exibility in technology and capacity choice between a mature and a newly established
ETS. In a new ETS, the technology and capacity determined in the pre-ETS environment
may not be optimal.6 Moreover, while in the long run policy makers will have better
information how the allocation of permits relates to each rms emissions level, in the
short run policy makers have only limited ex-ante knowledge of how rms will react to
an ETS. As a consequence, we expect in the long run no rm with market power is
allocated more permits than it needs to meet its regulatory obligations. In the short run
the policy makers' choice of the initial permits allocation to a rm with market power is
unrestrained (other than to be positive).
For the long run, we show that the key result by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) {
that quantity pre-commitment with Bertrand competition leads to Cournot results {
still holds under existence of an emissions trading scheme (ETS) with permit/product
4While our long-run analysis was developed directly based on Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), we
extend Loertscher's analysis, for the duopoly case, by allowing for an initial endowment of the input
good and analysing initial allocation eects. Moreover, we demonstrate that, under a costly capacity
constraint, also Cournot-Bertrand (input-output) competition yields Cournot outcomes while Loertscher
sticks to the cases of Cournot-Cournot and Bertrand-Bertrand competition.
5See Montero (2009) for an overview over this literature. Two exceptions, considering Bertrand
competition, constitute Requate (1993) and Montero (2002a). Requate states, in a setting with only a
two-rm industry, that the number of permits issued may act as a capacity constraint, leading to a Kreps-
and-Scheinkman style result. Montero compares R&D incentives from environmental-policy instruments
under perfect and imperfect output and permit markets in Cournot and Bertrand output duopoly. He
sticks to overall permit scarcity and does not treat initial allocation eects.
6For emissions-intensive industries, technology will tend to be too dirty and capacity too high.
3market interaction. In equilibrium, rms will hold permits such as to exactly cover their
emissions. Total industry emissions and the permit price are positively related to the size
of the free initial permits allocation to a rm of that sector.
In the short run, we study how a marginal change in the initial permit allocation to
a rm impacts on its equilibrium permit holdings, the permit price, and product market
outcomes under Bertrand competition. We consider both elastic and inelastic product
demand. In extension to the previous literature, we distinguish an interior and a boundary
solution depending on whether, in equilibrium, at least one rm holds excess permits or
all rms are constrained in their emissions. In the interior solution, we identify two kinds
of distortionary eects: the Hahn (monopsony/monopoly) eects (after Hahn 1984), and
the pass-through prot eect. Previously, they have implicitly been distinguished, e.g.,
by DiSegni Eshel (2005) in a dominant-rm setting, but not considered for Bertrand
competition. Pass-through prots, the pass-through prot eect, and thus the eect
on the permit price are greater under Bertrand than under Cournot competition, and
increase with demand inelasticity. On the boundary, a change in the initial allocation
leaves permit holdings, permit price, and product price unaected. Finally, we discuss
the threat of technology switching as an additional explanation for the permit price
phenomenon.
A positive allowance price in the face of an overall excess permit allocation, as it
occurred in the rst EU-ETS phase, can, hence, also be explained if a permit-and-product-
market oligopolist (whose initial permit allocation diers from its nal permit holdings)
competes in the product market in prices. As associated with an interior solution, this
price development is particularly likely to occur under an overall excess allocation of
permits and when permits are initially given for free. Conversely, in the short run, a
boundary solution and thus increased permit-market eciency are the more likely the
stricter the emissions target. We do not explicitly investigate an alternative permit
allocation mechanism or the implementation of the social optimum. From our study
nevertheless a case for auctioning of the initial permit allocation derives, as it will help
reduce pass-through prots and thus the distortionary eects of an ETS in both the short
4and the long run.
Section 2 introduces the model framework we use. Section 3 develops the short-run
analysis. Section 4 treats the long-run analysis. We discuss our results in section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a one-period model with four stages of an economy with polluting production
and an emissions trading system in which initial permits are allocated for free. Two com-
peting rms, i = a;b, with market power on both output and permit markets maximise
prots
i = pi  qi   qi  ci(qi;i)   (xi   x
0
i)  (X)   fi(Ki;i) such that qi  Ki ; (1)
where pi is the price charged by rm i, qi is the production quantity of rm i, ci is the
marginal output production cost of rm i, i 2 [0;1] is rm i's technology parameter, xi
and x0
i are the nal and initial holdings of permits for rm i, (:) is the market clearing
permit price, X = xi + xj is the combined permit holding of rms i and j, fi is the
capacity installation cost of rm i and Ki is rm i's capital.7 Emissions are by-produced
according to the function
ei(qi;i) = qi  (1   i) : (2)
In the permit market there is, moreover, a competitive fringe of polluting rms whose
product is no substitute for the output of the rms of the rst two types. The com-
petitive fringe in the permit market ensures that the permit supply (price) function, ,
is increasing with respect to the permit holdings of the market power rms.8 Through-
out we assume a xed overall level of permits, which may exceed the total amount of
7We adopt the convention that the subscript j indicates 6 i. The assumptions on the characteristics
of the functions used are set out below.
8To motivate this interpretation of  consider the structure of the permit market: at any given permit
price, the competitive fringe will demand some proportion of the xed level of permits, with the level of
demand decreasing with permit price (von der Fehr 1993).
5emissions from the sectors covered by the ETS.
We consider three formulations of this model. In the long-run models the choices
of production technology and production capacity are endogenous, technology choice
determines both marginal output production cost and the level of emissions per unit of
production. In the short run technology and capacity are exogenous.
Model 1 Long-run Bertrand model
1. Firms choose a production technology.
2. Firms install a costly production capacity.
3. Firms trade emissions permits.
4. Firms compete over prices in the product market.
The prot function as given generally in (1) for rm i in the long-run Bertrand model
(henceforth: the Bertrand model) depends on the price it sets, its output, its technology
parameter, its permit holdings and its capital, so that B
i (pi;qi;i;xi;Ki).
Model 2 Long-run Cournot model
1. Firms choose a production technology.
2. Firms compete over quantities in the product market.
3. Firms trade emissions permits.
The prot function in (1) for a typical rm in the long-run Cournot model (henceforth: the
Cournot model) depends on its quantity produced, its technology parameter, its permit
holdings and its capital, so that C
i (qi;i;xi;Ki). Note that in the Cournot model pi in
(1) is to be replaced by the market clearing price P which depends on the sum of outputs
produced by the two rms.
Model 3 Short-run model
1. Firms trade emissions permits.
62. Firms compete over prices in the product market.
As technology and capacity are exogenous, in the short-run model the last term of the
prot function (1) and the capital restriction vanish and marginal output production
costs will only depend on the amount of output produced, so that i(pi;xi).
For the subsequent analysis we invoke the following assumptions.9
Assumption 1 The output cost function c(q;): R
+
0 [0;1] ! R
+
0 is twice continuously
dierentiable, strictly convex, and satises c(0) = 0, @c




for all  2 [0;1].




0 is non-decreasing, twice
continuously dierentiable, convex, and satises (0)  0.
Following Kreps and Scheinkman (1983: 328), we further require:
Assumption 3 The output price function P(q) is strictly positive on some nite interval
(0;Q), on which it is twice-continuously dierentiable, strictly decreasing, and concave.
For q  Q, P(q) = 0.
Assumption 4 The installation cost function f(q;): R
+
0 [0;1] ! R
+
0 is twice contin-
uously dierentiable, convex, and satises f(0;) = 0,
@f
@q > 0 and
@f
@ > 0 for all q 2 R
+
0
and  2 [0;1].
Throughout we focus on the situation where both rms produce a positive amount
in equilibrium, and the equilibrium price is strictly positive. That is, we focus only on
non-trivial solutions.
Finally, the structures of the games need some discussion. We start with the short-
run model. Seeing the permit market as an input market and the product market as a
spot market, the given structure may seem natural: having received the initial allocation
of permits at the beginning of an ETS rms rst seek to cover their permit demand
before engaging in the product market. The structure ts equally well if the permit
9The treatment of the technology parameter  is drawn from von der Fehr (1993).
7market is interpreted as a forward market. For the case of electricity markets, the reverse
structure might be more realistic: much electricity is traded forward determining at the
same time the permit amount needed to comply with the ETS. We stick to the former
structure because it produces the more interesting results.10 That is, having the permit
choice occurring before product market competition allows for cost raising strategies to
be protable and allows for the investigation of interior solutions in the short run model.
We adopt the same structure in the long-run Bertrand model. For the Cournot model
the production decision is made before the permit holding is determined, so as to ensure
our main result Kreps and Scheinkman holds. The interpretation of the long run results
may be applied to both the Cournot and Bertrand models. Note that the Kreps and
Scheinkman result of the long-run analysis in section 4 is robust against a simultaneous
inversion of stages 2 and 3 in both the Cournot and Bertrand models.11
3 Short-Run Analysis
In the short run product demand is often relatively inelastic. Situations where demand
may be considered perfectly inelastic in the short run include staple foods and electricity.
Therefore, we analyze the cases of both elastic and inelastic product demand. In order to
prevent monopolistic style behaviour occurring in the inelastic case when the dierence in
the cost structures between oligopolistic rms is large, we consider two types of identical
rms and assume there to be at least two rms of each type. In addition, we take the
number of rms to be xed and suppose there are enough rms to meet demand. This
ensures that the capacity constraint does not directly inuence the results in the short
run. This seems reasonable in the initial stages of an ETS where overall production levels
are likely to fall relative to business-as-usual baselines.
10Our structure is also considered in von der Fehr (1993: subsection 3.1) for Cournot output compe-
tition and, similarly, in Loertscher's basic model. DiSegni Eshel (2005), von der Fehr (1993: subsection
3.3) consider simultaneous (spot) market competition for product and permits. Allaz and Vila (1993)
study the forward market interpretation for a Cournot spot market, Mahenc and Salani e (2004) for a
Bertrand spot market (Liski and Montero (2006) analyse the repeated context), but without focus on
initial allocation eects.
11The results are unlikely to be robust with respect to simultaneous permit and product market
decisions as the result of Lemma 5 will no longer hold.
8Firms of type a have lower marginal production costs but a higher emission intensity
than rms of type b, di designates the emission intensity per unit of production (i = a;b):12
ca(qa) + da  (X) < cb(qb) + db  (X) with da > db : (3)
In the short run, a rm faces a xed emissions intensity. The only abatement opportunity
available to a rm is thus to reduce production. We require compliance with the ETS 13
such that
xi  diqi (i = a;b): (4)
For the inelastic case we replace Assumptions 1 and 3, respectively, with the following
alternative set of assumptions (Assumption 2 continues to apply):




0 is constant and nite for the
closed interval [0; qi] and not dened for q > qi, so that rms have a capacity constraint
at qi. The capacities, qi, are such that
P
i2A qi < Q and
P
i2A;B qi > Q.
Assumption 6 Demand is perfectly inelastic and xed at some quantity Q > 0.
In contrast to Assumption 1, in the inelastic case marginal costs are constant and each
rm has an exogenous capacity constraint. Whilst the Assumptions 5 and 6 are restrictive,
they are only necessary to ensure that the prices in the inelastic demand scenario are the
same as prices in the elastic demand scenario. Corresponding results for the inelastic
demand scenario could be reproduced with less restrictive assumptions.
We solve the short-run model for sub-game perfect Nash equilibria using backwards
induction beginning with the second stage.
Lemma 1 In the second-stage pricing game, () there is, in the case of elastic product
demand, in a continuum of Nash equilibria. In all equilibria each producing rm charges
12For example, type a could be coal-red power plants, type b as gas-red power plants or renewable
generators with high xed costs. The specication rules out the case where one plant is both cheaper
to run and less emissions intensive. This case is not very interesting: the result is, intuitively, that
the low-cost, low-emission rms should satisfy as much of the demand as possible at any carbon price,
therefore industry emissions are independent of permit prices and initial allocations.
13This assumption is standard in the literature as most ETS impose large penalties for non-compliance.
For example, in the rst EU-ETS phase the non-compliance penalty was e40 per missing permit (in
phase two e100) plus a `make-good provision' requiring an extra permit surrendered the next year.
9the same price. The continuum of Nash equilibria includes one where each rm charges
a price equal to the marginal cost (including carbon costs) of the least cost eective unit:
p = cb(qb)+ db  (X) for all rms. () The latter is the unique Nash equilibrium in the
inelastic case.
The proof is given in Appendix A.1. As there are multiple equilibria for the elastic case
pricing game, we require a decision rule to select a single equilibrium. We assume all
rms set prices so that the least cost eective producing rm receives zero prots.
In the rst stage of the game, rms seek to maximise their prots (1) adapted for the
short-run case over their permit holdings given the optimal choice of the output price
in the second stage and the compliance condition (4). We have to distinguish the cases
of (a) an interior solution, where at least one rm holds more permits than required,
x
i > diq
i, and (b) a boundary solution, where all permits are utilised to cover actual
emissions, x
i = diq
i for all rms (see Figure 1 for an illustration).
Figure 1: Distinction of (a) interior and (b) boundary solution in permit-choice game.
In an interior solution, in equilibrium, we require the following rst- and second-order



















































10Remark 1 Condition (5b) is necessary to ensure the solutions to conditions (5a) char-
acterise a maximum. Sucient, but not necessary, for condition (5b) to hold is that (X)
is linear.
The proof is given in Appendix A.2. In a boundary solution, the optimal permit holding
constrains production, so that x
i = diq
i.
Proposition 1 summarises the eects of an increase in the initial permit allocation to
a rm on its optimal permit holdings, the permit price, and the product price.
Proposition 1 Given a reallocation of initial permits from the competitive fringe to a
market-power rm does not induce a change of the marginal unit of production in the
rst-stage permit-choice problem, it will,
a) in an interior solution, increase
￿ the number of permits the rm holds in equilibrium,
￿ the permit price, and
￿ the product price (i.e., increase pass-through prots),
b) in a boundary solution, have no eect on
￿ the number of permits the rm holds in equilibrium,
￿ the permit price, or
￿ the product price (i.e., there is no additional pass-through prot).
These results hold irrespective of whether demand is elastic or inelastic.
Proof. a) Let x
i be the solution to problem (5a),
@i





@xi > 0 and
@2i
@x2




i > 0 and
@
@x0
i > 0 (Figure 2). Lemma 1 implies that the product price also increases.
b) By denition, a boundary solution indicates that compliance condition (4) holds
with equality. The solution to the problem is, hence, x
i = diqi (i = a;b). As it is inde-
pendent of x0
i, the initial permit allocation has no bearing on the solution. 
11We x the marginal unit of production in Proposition 1 for clarity of results. As
applied to power markets, for example, this assumption means that the merit order does
not change. Figure 2 illustrates the proof of Proposition 1.a. As x0
i increases the optimal
Figure 2: Illustration to the proof of Proposition 1.a.
permit holding moves from x to x. As
@2i
@xi@x0
i > 0, an increase in x0
i will increase the
rst derivative
@i
@xi at all points along the prot curve. Thus, at the point where
@i
@xi = 0
for the original allocation of x0
i,
@i




i < 0, there
must be a value of x greater than the original x that will cause
@2i
@x2
i = 0. The increase
in the initial permit allocation shifts the prot function up and to the right.
The likelihood of a boundary solution depends on the strength of the overall emissions
target for the ETS.
Corollary 1 A tightening of the emissions target reduces the optimal holding of permits
for each rm, and increases the range of production technologies that produce a boundary
solution.
The proof is given in Appendix A.3.
Permit-market eciency requires all rms, in all industries, have the same marginal
abatement costs in equilibrium. In our model all other industries are price takers in the
permit market, and will, with Montgomery (1972), hold the ecient permit amount. To
analyse permit-market eciency we can thus focus on the rms with market power.
Case 1 Interior solution (x
i > diq
i for at least one rm)
12It may aid intuition to rewrite the rst-order conditions (5a) in the form where marginal
benets equate marginal costs. Equation (6) is for inelastic, (7) for elastic demand:
@p
@xi




















In the inelastic case, receiving an extra permit for free reduces a rm's marginal cost
of purchasing another permit but leaves its marginal benet unchanged. Thus, the rm
seeks to purchase additional permits, which raises the permit price. In the elastic case,
the marginal benet from permit holding includes an additional term, capturing the cost
reduction associated with the decreased production due to the increased permit holding;
moreover, an additional cost term captures the revenue loss associated with the decreased
production. As the price will exceed a rm's costs, marginal costs of an additional permit
increase more than its marginal benets. As purchasing an additional permit increases
the product market price (reducing the quantity sold), the permit holding for each rm
will be lower under elastic demand than under inelastic.
Equations (6) and (7) show two distortionary eects which arise in relation to the
oligopolists' market power in permit and product market. As qualitatively the same for
elastic and inelastic demand, we only discuss the inelastic case. Note, rst, that the
marginal costs of an additional permit held in equilibrium are not equal to the permit
price, (X). They also comprise a term for the extra amount to be paid for all other
permits purchased, (xi   x0
i)
@
@xi. It decreases in the initial allocation, increases with the
permits held, and vanishes if the initial allocation exactly equals the rm's permit holdings
in equilibrium. It is positive if and only if the rm is a net seller (xi   x0
i > 0), causing
lower permit holdings than under perfect competition (as discussed in detail in (Hahn
1984)). We call this eect the Hahn monopsony eect. For a net buyer (xi   x0
i < 0), it
is negative, causing higher permit holdings than in the perfectly competitive case { the
Hahn monopoly eect. Second, purchasing an extra permit implies a benet due to the
increase in revenue,
@p
@xiqi. Compared to a situation without pass-through prots, prots
13and permit holdings are increased. We refer to this as the pass-through prot eect. Note
that in the inelastic case, marginal changes in the initial permit allocation have no eect
on production: in an internal solution the output is already at a maximum and is not
aected by permit holdings.
Given the emissions target is set such that marginal social benets of pollution re-
duction are equal to its marginal social costs, the permit market cannot be operating
eciently if a rm's permit holdings exceed its emissions in equilibrium; non-utilised
permits imply emissions below their socially ecient level.15 The two kinds of initial al-
location eects described have opposing impacts on market eciency. When rms are net
permit buyers, market eciency is improved by the Hahn monopsony eect, but declines
by the pass-through prot eect, as the initial allocation increases. When rms are net
permit sellers, market eciency declines due to both Hahn monopoly and pass-through
prot eect, as the initial allocation increases. Thus, we would expect the ecient initial
allocation here to be smaller than in the ecient case discussed by Hahn (1984).
If the permit market were perfectly competitive, then Hahn's results for eciency
hold irrespective of the choice of Bertrand or Cournot competition. Using Bertrand
competition here allows us to model pass-through prots in a more intuitive manner:
changes in permit allocation directly aect prices in a Bertrand framework, rather than
as a secondary ow on eect from quantity choices under Cournot competition. The
Hahn eects will exist in a formulation with Cournot output competition, too, as will
the pass-through prot eect. The size of the pass-through prot eect, however, is
smaller with Cournot than with Bertrand. The purchase of an additional permit by any
rm will raise the permit price, raising the carbon-inclusive marginal costs of the least
cost-eective rm. The extent of the pass-through prot eect is determined by the rate
of transmission of this increase in marginal costs to the product market price. In our
Bertrand formulation, where we have chosen to focus on the unique equilibrium where
the price equals the marginal cost of the least cost-eective rm, this transmission rate is
15In a similar vein Smith and Yates (2003) show that non-emitting members of the economy purchasing
and retiring permits (e.g., environmental groups) is a signal of an inecient market, although in their
model the ineciency stems from uncertainty over the optimal size of the emissions target.
14100 per cent; under Cournot competition it will be less than 100 per cent. Pass-through
prots cause, hence, greater distortions under Bertrand competition.
Case 2 Boundary solution (x
i = diq
i for all rms)
In a boundary solution to the rst-stage permit-choice problem, the results are indepen-
dent of whether demand is inelastic or elastic. In both cases a small change in the initial
permit allocation will not aect the solution to that problem; it will still lie on the bound-
ary. The proof of Proposition 1 implies that with an increase in the initial allocation of
permits the prot function shifts up and to the right.16 Hence, a marginal increase in
the initial allocation here simply raises the rm's prots. Thus, the pass-through prot
eect still exists in the sense that the existence of a positive permit price implies that
the product market price is higher than it would be if the price of permits was 0. But
the initial permit allocation to a rm no longer aects the pass-through prot eect. As
on the boundary the equilibrium permit holdings do not change, marginal changes in
the initial permit allocation have no eect on production; permits are expensive enough
that rms simply wish to minimise their holdings for a given quantity of production.
All permits are utilised to cover actual emissions. For a boundary solution, the initial
allocation of permits has no impact on eciency because the solution is independent of
the initial allocation of permits. In a more long-run view, however, the initial allocation
of permits may aect the entry/exit decision of rms as a high initial allocation creates
higher prots. Thus, at least one initial allocation of permits will lead to eciency of the
permit trading scheme. In practice, it would be extremely dicult to give the correct
initial allocation to all rms, implying that least-cost emissions reductions are unlikely
to be achieved.
Hence, in the short run, when capacity and technology choice is xed, the eciency
of an ETS depends much on whether rms with market power are constrained by the
requirement to hold permits. (It is clear that when the potential for pass-through prots
exists, the pattern of the initial allocation of permits may aect both the nal distribution
16The stationary point of the prot function occurs at a higher level of permit holdings, and the initial
wealth of the rm has increased (Figure 2).
15of permits amongst rms and the permit price, through the pass-through prot eect
and Hahn eects.) If rms are constrained by the requirement to hold permits the initial
allocation of permits aects rms' prots, but not their optimal permit holdings. In no
circumstances does a marginal change in the initial allocation of permits aect the level
of production in the short run when demand is perfectly inelastic. In the case of elastic
demand (where the comparison is possible), the eect of permit allocations on permit
prices is greater in Bertrand competition than Cournot competition.
3.1 Technology Switching
In this subsection we extend the analysis to consider the potential for technology switch-
ing. Because each rm has a xed production technology, technology switching may only
be observed at the industry level. We relax the assumption of equation (3), to allow type-
b rms to have lower marginal costs for some values of (X). As ca < cb and da > db,
type-a rms will be cheaper at low values of  (and type-b rms cheaper at high values).
We dene the technology-switching carbon price, , as the value of  such that
ca(qa) + da  (X) = cb(qb) + db  (X) : (8)
The impact of  will depend on the elasticity of the function (X).
The inclusion of a switching price introduces a discontinuity in equation (5a). The
assumption that rms price such that the least cost eective rm receives zero prots
implies that the discontinuity is a downward (upward) shift in prot for type-a (b) rms
as a marginal change in permit holdings induces a shift in (X) from     to  + 
for small . Therefore, a type-a rm would prefer the carbon price to be slightly below
(rather than slightly above) the switching price. At an industry level, overall production
from type-a rms would be larger when the carbon price is slightly below the switching
price (as type-a rms are relatively cheaper). This relatively higher production from
type-a rms may be viewed as industry-level technology switching.
As in order to produce a rm must hold a positive quantity of permits, the ability
16for type-a rms to place downward pressure on  is constrained, whereas the ability
for type-b rms to place upward pressure on  is not. Thus when (X) is relatively
elastic, type-b rms will purchase sucient permits such that (X) > . When (X) is
relatively inelastic, purchasing sucient permits such that (X) >  may be prohibitively
expensive for type-b rms, and the carbon price may be below the switching point. Hence,
the carbon price is more likely to be below (above) the switching price when type-a (b)
rms have greater market power.17 In particular, if type-a rms have more market power
than type-b rms, and (X) is relatively inelastic, then the switching price may act as
an articial ceiling for the carbon price.
4 Long-Run Analysis
We now turn to the long-run models, Models 1 and 2, of section 2. We solve the long-run
models by rst exogenously xing technology choice and demonstrating the Kreps and
Scheinkman result. To do this, we solve the Cournot sub-game for sub-game perfect
Nash equilibria (SPNE) using backward induction. We show that the solution for the
Cournot game is identical to the corresponding Bertrand formulation. We then endogenise
technology choice and conduct comparative statics on the initial permit allocation. Again,




We solve the Cournot game, as presented in Model 2, beginning with the third stage,
where each rm simultaneously maximises its prot (1) (with P(qi + qj) substituted for
pi) such that the full-compliance requirement holds (x
i  e
i).
Lemma 2 For an initial permit allocation x0




i(1   i) for i = a;b.
Proof. For all xi  x0
i,
@i
@xi =  (xi   x0
i)
@
@xi   (X) < 0. The solution follows. 
17Factors that determine market power include, for example, the output market share, the initial
allocation of permits and the comparative costs of production.
17Thus, rms will only hold permits to cover their emissions exactly. The assumption
that x0
i  ei is sucient but not necessary; the solution given in Lemma 2 above will
still hold as long as the excess allocation of permits is not too large (
@i
@xi still negative).
The intuition is: the model requires that a rm cannot hold less permits than it produces
emissions. This can, for example, be ensured by high non-compliance penalties. Also, it
is not protable for a rm to hold more permits than is necessary. Doing so involves an
additional cost for no additional benets as production and revenues have already been




i(1   i) into equation (1), the rst-stage quantity max-





i = qi  P(qi + qj)   qi  ci(i)   [qi(1   i)   x
0
i]  [•]   fi(qi;i) ; (9)
where [•] = [qi(1   i) + qj(1   j)].
Lemma 3 The SPNE for the two-stage game where rms compete under Cournot com-
petition and then purchase emissions permits can be found by solving problem (9) simul-
taneously for all rms.
Proof. Existence and uniqueness of the solution to problem (9) follow from Tirole
(1988: 225n). 
4.2 Bertrand Game with Cournot Outcomes
Now turn to a Bertrand version of the game, with quantity precommitment, as given
by Model 1. Again we solve for sub-game perfect Nash equilibria. We rst analyse the
stage-4 pricing game, for given technologies (stage 1), capacity constraints (stage 2) and
permit holdings (stage 3). Kreps and Scheinkman (1983: 335) summarize the required
results for the stage-4 pricing subgame in the following proposition which we reproduce
adapted to our notation and setting for convenience. Let Ki denote the installed capacity
18Note that this is dierent from our short-run model, where it may be protable to hold excess permits
to raise a rival's costs, or to manipulate the market.
18of rm i, q
i the solution to problem (9), and qi(Kj) the optimal solution to problem (9)
for a rm, when its competing rm installs capacity Kj.19
Proposition 2 (adapted from Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)).
1. If Ki  q
i for the two rms, i = a;b, both rms name price pa = pb = p =
P(Ka + Kb), where Ka, Kb are the capacity constraints installed in stage 1. Thus
each rm has revenue Ki  P(Ka + Kb).
2. If Ka  Kb and Ka > q
a, rm a has expected revenue qa(Kb)P(qa(Kb)+Kb) whilst
rm b has a uniquely determined expected revenue between
Kb
Kaqa(Kb)P(qa(Kb)+Kb)
and qa(Kb)P(qa(Kb) + Kb).
3. If Kb  Ka and Kb > q
b, rm b has expected revenue qb(Ka)P(qb(Ka) + Ka) whilst
rm a has a uniquely determined expected revenue between Ka
Kbqb(Ka)P(qb(Ka)+Ka)
and qb(Ka)P(qb(Ka) + Ka).
We now determine the optimal permit holdings in the stage-3 game, noting that the
permit choice does not directly aect the results of Proposition 2. The only impact permit
holdings have on a rm's pricing decision is that they may act as an articial capacity
constraint, if xi < Ki(1   i). When xi  Ki(1   i), there is no impact on the pricing
game as the cost of purchasing permits is, by assumption, sunk during the pricing game.
Lemma 4 Let Ki be rm i's installed capacity, i = a;b. Then, its optimal permit holding
is x
i = ei = Ki(1   i).
The proof is given in Appendix A.4. The intuition is probably more instructive. A rm
has no incentive to purchase more than ei permits. For, to do so would incur a cost that
cannot be recovered, and has no strategic advantage { the rival rm will still be able to
purchase the full amount of permits required, and regard this cost as sunk in the pricing
game (stage 3). A rm also will never purchase less than ei in a consistent equilibrium.
19Note that the proof in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) is for the case when marginal costs are 0. Here
we have positive marginal costs. But this does not change the nature of the results for situations where
both rms produce positive quantities (ibid.: 337).
19To do so would imply there was an over-investment in capacity. Clearly, then, a rm
must purchase x
i = ei emissions permits.
As might be expected in a game with perfect information, the rms' choice of xi, and
the associated unit costs, can be calculated following the rm's capacity choice. Thus,
the permit costs may be incorporated into installation costs at the stage-2 decision. As
they are sunk during the stage-4 pricing game, permit costs are then indistinguishable
from installation costs, which obviously are also considered as sunk. To state the next
lemma we introduce the following function F, it may be considered a `sunk cost function.'
F(Ki;i;Kj;j)  fi(Ki;i) + [Ki(1   i)   x
0
i]  [Ki(1   i) + Kj(1   j)] : (10)
Lemma 5 Assume 0  x0





0 [0;1] ! R
+
0 is twice continuously dierentiable, and satises F(0;i;Kj;j) = 0,
@F(Ki;i;Kj;j)
@Ki jKi=0 > 0 and
@2F(Ki;i;Kj;j)
@K2
i > 0 for all Ki;Kj 2 R
+
0 and i;j 2 [0;1].
The proof is given in Appendix A.5.
Stages 2 and 3 of Model 1 may be interpreted as a single-stage capacity installation
process, where rm i's prot, i = a;b, can be written as

B
i = qi  P(qi + qj)   qi  ci(i)   Fi(Ki;i;Kj;j) : (11)
Thus, our game has the same form as the game presented in Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983), with the exception that our installation cost function depends on the capacity of
the rival rm. Lemma 4 demonstrates, however, that the choice of permit holdings is not
aected by the rival rm's choice of capacity. Hence, our model presented in equation
(11) is equivalent to the model presented in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983).
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) show that both rms will select quantities such that
q
i = Ki, and, hence, such that the equilibrium price is determined by the rst condition
20This assumption is not strictly necessary. The permit allocation must not be `too' high, however.





i = qi  P(qi + qj)   qi  ci(i)   [qi(1   i)   x
0
i]  [•]   fi(qi;i) ; i = a;b ; (12)
where [•] = [qi(1   i) + qj(1   j)]. Problem (12) is identical to problem (9), the
equivalent problem for the Cournot case. We conclude:
Proposition 3 The two-stage game where rms compete under Cournot competition and
then purchase emissions permits yields the same results as the three-stage game where each
rm installs costly production capacity, purchases emissions permits and then competes
under Bertrand competition. The equilibrium of both games can be found by solving
problem (12) simultaneously for all rms.
The Kreps-and-Scheinkman framework has received much attention over the past two
decades. For our application of Kreps and Scheinkman the structure of the game is im-
portant. The key parameter is the timing of the permit-choice and quantity-competition
stages (the capacity-installation stage in the Bertrand formulation). If capacity installa-
tion occured after the purchase of permits, our function F would not exhibit the correct
shape to allow the Kreps-and-Scheinkman result to hold. Note the symmetry between
the Cournot and Bertrand formulations. In both formulations the quantity competition
stage occurs before the purchase of permits. Changing the order of events in only one of
the games invalidates the results. A similar Kreps-and-Scheinkman result could, however,
be generated, if the rst stage of both games was the purchase of permits.22
21Much of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) is in fact dedicated to dismiss conditions two and three
in Proposition 2 as o-equilibrium paths: when rms install excess capacity they intensify the price
competition in the third stage of the game and reduce their prots.
22That varied situation may generate dierent results in the following subsection 4.3. We do not
consider the case further as there is no clear economic intuition to support a rm purchasing emissions
permits before it installs production capacity.
214.3 Eects of the Initial Permit Allocation on Permit-Market
Eciency
We now consider the technology choice stage of games 2 and 1. Both of these models are
equivalent to the two-stage game where rms maximise the prot function as (identically)
contained in problems (9) and (12) by rst making a choice of technology, i, and then
choosing a quantity of production. We use the two-stage formulation of the game for
analytical ease and focus on the choice of technology.
The optimal strategy for a rm in the rst stage is to choose  such that the following

























< 0 : (13b)
Optimality of the second-stage production decision implies
@i
@qi = 0, and the simultaneity
of the permit choice that
dj







dqj = 0 : (14)
Remark 2 Condition (13b) is required to ensure that the value of i, found by solving
either condition (13a) or condition (14), is a maximum.
For the rest of this section, we assume that condition (13b) holds.
Again, we study how a marginal change in the initial permit allocation to a rm
aects the equilibrium. Unfortunately, its eect on technology and production choices of
each rm is ambiguous. For, an increase in the initial permit allocation may lead to the
installation of either cleaner or dirtier technology, and may either increase or decrease a
rm's total cost function, depending on the relative slopes of the product demand, permit
price and cost functions.23 Moreover, the long-run model, unlike the short-run model,
23Consider, for example, the case where an increase in the initial allocation promotes the installation of
cleaner technology, which increases the rms' total cost of production. (As cleaner technology has lower
22does not explicitly include a variable for permit holdings { they are uniquely determined
by technology installed and quantity produced. Therefore, Hahn or pass-through prot
eects cannot be isolated.
Proposition 4 summarises these eects. The results hold for all initial allocations of
permits, and in particular irrespective of the sign of (x   x0).24
Proposition 4 A reallocation of initial permits from the competitive fringe to a rm
with market power in the permit and product market will:
￿ increase total industry emissions,
￿ increase the price of permits.
The proof is given in Appendix A.6.
Again, the result is quite pessimistic when considering the ability of an ETS to provide
least-cost emissions reductions. For least-cost abatement, all rms must have an equal
MAC in equilibrium. The fact that emissions depend on the initial allocation implies
that eciency in the permit market can only occur if and only if regulators choose the
`correct' initial allocation of permits. Specically, as the emissions, and therefore the
MAC, of both rms depend on the free allocation of permits to both rms, the `correct'
initial allocations ensuring MAC is equalised across both rms is likely to be impossible
to determine in a realistic situation.
Note, moreover, that permit-market eciency does not imply an optimal level of in-
vestment in technology; it only implies that the MAC is equal for all rms, for a given
level of technology. Optimal technology investment would imply a given level of produc-
tion is produced at least total cost, which comprise both monetary and environmental
cost. Permit-market eciency is a necessary condition for optimal investment: without it
a rm will not internalise the environmental externalities associated with their technology
installation costs, but higher marginal costs, it may either increase or decrease total costs.) Becoming
less competitive the rm reduces production, causing a loss in prots from production. The reduction
in production and the cleaner technology make it require fewer emissions permits (it is less polluting),
causing a rise in prots from permit sale. The competing rm will, however, increase production levels,
because it faces weaker competition. The competitor may also install dirtier technology, increasing its
permit holdings and emissions levels. The net eect of the increase in the initial permit allocation will
be an increase in total industry emissions.
24The results are, of course, subject to Assumptions 3 and 4 and the structure of the games.
23choice. Without being more specic about the relative slopes of product demand, permit
price and cost functions we cannot further detail how the initial allocation of permits
might be used to promote social eciency.
In the long run, it cannot be protable for a rm to hold more permits than required
for compliance. This makes intuitive sense, as any commitment to holding excess permits
would not be expected to be sustainable in the long term. As a consequence, permit-
market eciency is more likely in the long than the short run.
5 Discussion
We discuss the argumentative application of our analysis to EU ETS and power sector
in subsection 5.1. Subsection 5.2 considers our contribution to the literature on permit-
market eciency, the literature with a (more) long-run view in environmental economics,
and to general industrial organisation. Subsection 5.3 contains policy implications.
5.1 Argumentative Application to EU ETS and Power Sector
As set out in the introduction, our analysis has a particular argumentative application
to the EU ETS and the price phenomenon which occurred in its rst trading phase 2005-
2007. Our short-run analysis shows that some rms may have a strategic advantage from
holding more permits than they have emissions. For example, if electricity generators
(who face inelastic demand in the short run) were allocated permits such that their
optimal permit choice is an interior solution to problem (5), then their actions would
have directly contributed to the high permit prices. The possibility of individual excess
permit holdings in equilibrium in the situation of an overall permit over-allocation with
positive permit price has been treated in the literature, but only for the case of perfect
or Cournot competition and elastic demand in the product market (e.g., Maeda 2003,
DiSegni Eshel 2005). We show that the Hahn monopsony and monopoly eects and a
pass-through prot eect also occur under Bertrand competition and elastic or inelastic
product demand (Proposition 1). In particular, in the interior solution, the pass-through
24prot eect becomes the bigger the more inelastic product demand, reaching 100 per
cent for inelastic demand, it is always bigger than under Cournot. Such very high pass-
through rates of (opportunity) costs to consumers { hence, windfall prots { are in line
with empirical evidence for the power sector (Sijm et al. 2006). This makes a case for
the realism of considering Bertrand output competition in this setting. The empirical
verication, however, whether certain companies did exercise permit market power in the
permit market in the rst EU-ETS phase hinges on the availability of rm-level data,
especially of permit holdings and permit-market transactions. This data is currently still
condential.
The analysis in section 3.1 provides a potential explanation of the price movements in
the EU ETS from April - October 2006. Sijm et al. (2006) estimate the carbon switching
price (from coal to gas generation) as being approximately e18.5. Given that the carbon
price is likely to have been relatively inelastic with respect to an individual rms' permit
holdings, and that coal generators were awarded a large quantity of grandfathered permits
(engendering them with potential market power), the observed prices during this period
are consistent with the switching price acting as a price ceiling.
The long-run analysis in section 4 looks at the case where sucient time has elapsed
for rms to update and reinstall their production technology, as it may be expected in
an established ETS. The extended Kreps-and-Scheinkman model then predicts that an
increase in the free permit allocation to a sector with market power in permit and product
market (such as conceivably the electricity industry) increases the permit price. In the
long run, rms do not have an incentive to hold excess permits anymore because they can
adjust their technology. This long-run eect will hardly have played a role for the price
decline later in the rst EU-ETS phase. The allowances rather lost their value because,
in addition to their relative abundance, they could not be banked for the second phase.
255.2 Bertrand versus Cournot and Long-Run Considerations in
the Literature
Studies on permit-market eciency have been following two modelling strategies. Either
they have focused on the permit market, assuming there is no feedback from the output
market structure; or, if they include the product market, competition on it has typically
been modelled in quantities.25 Clearly, from a technical viewpoint, it is much easier to
work with Cournot rather than Bertrand competition. Bertrand, however, is more general
in that it can also treat inelastic product demand. Moreover, for the short-run case, it
may provide results that are, e.g., with respect to pass-through prot rates, closer to
empirical ndings than under Cournot competition. Whilst it is intuitively more natural
for many markets to use Bertrand competition under an ETS, the fact that, under certain
conditions, equivalence between the Bertrand and Cournot versions of the game can be
established also under an ETS (Proposition 3), implies that we may use a Cournot game
to approximate these cases.26
The long-run aspect with endogenous technology and capacity choice (as developed
in section 4) has in the literature on permit-market eciency thus far only been con-
sidered by von der Fehr (1993: subsection 3.3), but not with Bertrand competition or a
focus of initial allocation eects. It adds in particular to contributions which compare
R&D incentives from dierent environmental-policy instruments under dierent degrees
of perfection of output and permit markets and, hence, also go beyond the question of
static short-run eciency (e.g., Montero 2002b,a, Bruneau 2004). They show that under
25Studies of the rst type include, e.g., Hahn (1984), Westskog (1996), Maeda (2003), Malueg and
Yates (2009), Lange (2008), Wirl (2009); of the second type Misiolek and Elder (1989), von der Fehr
(1993), Requate (1993), Sartzetakis (1997, 2004), Montero (2002a,b), DiSegni Eshel (2005). (Exceptions
with respect to Cournot output competition include Requate (1993) and Montero (2002a), cf. footnote
5.) As a rm's main concern is to ensure it has enough permits to cover its emissions, market power in
the permit market has typically been modelled with competition in quantities (only Lange 2008, Malueg
and Yates 2009 and Wirl 2009 have recently also considered supply function equilibria).
26It is interesting to note that also the literature on power market regulation has been concentrating
on Cournot competition and supply function equilibria (e.g., Borenstein et al. 2000, Joskow and Tirole
2000, Gilbert et al. 2004, Willems et al. 2009) { although Wolfram (1999), for example, shows that
both models predict markedly excessive mark-ups for British electricity spot prices in the 1990s. Also
Bushnell et al. (2008) can approximate actual spot prices in several US states in their static Cournot
framework only by taking into account (the frequently used) long-term contracts between utilities and
retailers. Whether this softening eect of forward commitments on competition also holds in a dynamic
setting is, however, doubted in the theoretical literature (Liski and Montero 2006).
26market power, contrary to perfect competition, command-and-control instruments may
generate stronger incentives to innovate than market-based instruments. Moreover, their
results for Cournot and Bertrand output competition do not in general coincide. This un-
derlines the importance of both market-power issues and the distinct analysis of dierent
forms of imperfect competition also in the more long-run view.27
Our long-run analysis was developed directly based on Kreps and Scheinkman (1983),
who focus only on a single output market. Loertscher (2008) has recently summarized and
extended the literature dealing with their framework to cover the situation where rms
compete, as market-making oligopolists, on both input and output markets. Interpreting
the permit market as the input market, our model may be considered a variation of
Loertscher's model. We extend his analysis, for the duopoly case, by allowing for an
initial endowment of the input good and analysing initial allocation eects. While we
interpret this endowment as an initial allocation of emissions permits, it could also be seen
as an initial inventory of stock. A second extension concerns the combination of forms of
competition in input and output market. While Loertscher treats the cases of Cournot-
Cournot and Bertrand-Bertrand (input-output) competition, we demonstrate that, under
a costly capacity constraint, also Cournot-Bertrand competition yields Cournot outcomes.
Our analysis, like Loertscher, uses ecient demand rationing and does not consider
uncertainty. According to the ecient rationing rule, customers with the highest reser-
vation prices are serviced by the rm with the lowest prices. This rule is applied, for
example, in electricity spot markets where a centralised authority, having received the
utilities' price bids, clears the market according to it in intervals of several minutes. But
it cannot be expected to hold in real-world markets in general. The use of alternative
rationing rules can lead to dierent results (including mixed strategy equilibria) in the
Kreps-and-Scheinkman second-stage pricing game over some range of the parameter (ca-
pacity) space (Davidson and Deneckere 1986). Ecient and proportional rationing lead
to the benchmark results between which equilibrium behaviour is likely to be more ag-
gressive than under Cournot competition, but less competitive than in the Bertrand case
27Interesting is also the idea to compare the option values of permits purchase and abatement measures
in view of their (ir-)reversibility (e.g., Chao and Wilson 1993).
27(Loertscher 2008). Moreover, the Kreps-and-Scheinkman result has been shown to be
robust even under proportional rationing if capacity cost is suciently high (Davidson
and Deneckere 1986) and independently of the prevailing rationing rule if all costs are
sunk at the rst stage and demand is uniformly elastic (Madden 1998). Reynolds and
Wilson (2000) nd that, under uncertain demand at capacity installation, in many cases
a symmetric equilibrium does not exist, even for identical rms. Our framework does not
focus on symmetric rms, so we do not expect symmetric solutions. The introduction
of uncertainty may be an interesting extension to our analysis (e.g., Baldursson and von
der Fehr 2004).
5.3 Policy Implications
The ETS design implications in the face of rms with market power in permit and product
market one may derive from our analysis are independent of the kind of output compe-
tition, but dier to some extent for short and long run. In both cases, replacing free
allocation by auctioning of the initial permit allocation will reduce pass-through prots,
and is likely to lead to eciency increases. In the short run, in an interior solution, it
is, however, not clear whether full permit auctioning decreases the impact of the Hahn
eects. For, permits are normally auctioned in conjunction to a secondary permit mar-
ket. A rm with market power may purchase some permits at auction and some in the
secondary market, leading to less eciency gains than possible if it got all of its permits
from the auction. (We assume an ecient auction.) A particular contribution of this pa-
per is to explicitly treat the boundary solutions in the short-run analysis, where permit
holdings, permit price and product price in equilibrium are independent from the initial
permit allocation given to the rms. We show that a boundary solution is the more likely
the more stringent the emissions target (Corollary 1).28 Again, also with a suciently
stringent target permit-market eciency is more easily achieved with auctioning of the
initial permits than if they are given for free. Note that in the EU ETS auctioning will
be the dominant allocation method for the electricity sector from 2013 and will become
28In line with this conclusion, in relation to the earlier US SO2 markets (with wide free allocation but
stringent targets) market power did not occur as an issue (Joskow et al. 1998, Stavins 1998).
28more relevant for other sectors as free allocation is gradually phased out by 2027 (with
the exception of free allocations to sectors with a risk of leakage) (EU 2009).
In the long run, in our case without banking of permits, holding more permits than
required for compliance cannot be protable for a rm. For equalisation of the rms' MAC
under the ETS, and hence least-cost abatement, auctioning of initial permits remains
advantageous over free allocation. Indeed, due to the unsustainability of holding excess
permits in the long term, permit-market eciency is more likely in the long than the short
run. However, the stringency of the emissions target does not impact on the likelihood
of permit-market eciency in the long run.
6 Conclusion
We study how the initial allocation of permits given to companies at the beginning of
an emissions trading phase impacts on their behaviour and market outcomes, when rms
have market power in permit and product market. We develop a long-run model with
endogenous technology and capacity choice, and a short-run model with xed technology
and capacity. The latter extends the standard models of market power in ETS (e.g.,
Hahn 1984, von der Fehr 1993, Westskog 1996) by consideration of the output market
with Bertrand competition. The long-run analysis introduces permit trading in capacity-
choice models, such as that of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). We show that, in the short
run, initial allocation eects derived with Cournot competition carry over to Bertrand
output competition, with two extensions. The Bertrand case is more general in that
it can also treat inelastic product demand; and it generates higher pass-through prot
rates (similar to those which could be observed for the electricity industry under the
EU ETS). In the long run, under endogenous technology and capacity choice, Bertrand
competition yields Cournot outcomes also under an ETS, if corresponding structures of
the two versions of the game are chosen. Qualications in the literature with respect to
the demand rationing rule apply. A crucial assumption in this paper is that the initial
permit allocation is given to the rms for free. We show that in the short run (also
29under free allocation), permit-market eciency is likely to increase with the strength of
the emissions target. Further eciency increases could be achieved by auctioning the
permits.
Our analysis is based on static games under certainty. Whether the results are robust
in a dynamic setting, as may be more realistic especially in an established ETS, and how
they may change if uncertainty is taken into account constitute interesting extensions for
future research.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
() The case of elastic demand is covered in Dastidar (1995), see in particular Lemma 9
and Proposition 2. () For the case of inelastic demand, it will clearly be protable for
type-a rms to produce to their capacities, and to charge the highest price possible. Type-
b rms compete over the residual demand under Bertrand competition with constant
marginal costs. As is well known, the solution for this problem is for type-b rms to
charge price equal to marginal cost. Type-a rms want to price as high as possible: given
ecient rationing, they can charge equal to the marginal cost of type-b rms and still sell
their full capacity. Thus the solution is for all rms to charge equal to the marginal cost
of type-b rms. 



































i  0 hold from Assumptions 5 and 2.
(X) linear implies that
@2
@x2
i = 0. For rms of type a, (X) linear also implies that
@2p
@x2



















































































which is negative when (X) is linear. 
A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
A tightening of the emissions target can be introduced to the model as an exogenous
increase in the permit price function, . An increase in  decreases
@i
@xi and, by the
same logic as presented in the proof of Proposition 1.a, reduces the equilibrium value of
x
i for any given production technology (as represented by the continuous variable  in
the long-run models, but exogenous and hidden in the short run model). All production
technologies that previously produced a boundary solution will still produce a boundary
solution. Also, there will be at least 1 new production technology that will produce
a boundary solution (e.g. the production technology that previously gave the solution
x
i = diq
i +  for small ). 
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Let (xi;Ki) denote the prot of rm i as in equation (1) when it installs capacity Ki,
purchases permits xi and prices are determined as in Proposition 2, for a given choice
of permits by the opposing rm. We begin by using forwards induction to eliminate
xi < x
i. We denote the capacity constraint implied by the permit holding xi < x
i by
^ Ki = xi=(1   i). Now, (xi; ^ Ki) > (xi;Ki). This implies that the rm has `over-
installed' capacity in the rst stage of the game, and we reject this situation as an
equilibrium using the concept of forward equilibrium. For xi > x
i the capacity constraint
is Ki. Now, (x
i;Ki) > (xi;Ki). Hence, a rm will not install permits such that
xi > x
i. Therefore, rms will install permits such that xi = x
i for i = a;b. 
31A.5 Proof of Lemma 5
The double continuous dierentiability follows from Assumption 4. At Ki = 0, @F
@Ki =
@fi
@Ki + (1   i)[Ki(1   i) + Kj(1   j)] + [Ki(1   i)   x0
i]
@






i + 2(1   i)
@




i > 0. 
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
























i > 0, and, by condition (13b),
di
dx0
i > 0, such that
d
dx0












i > 0. Then, with Assumption 2 and Lemma 2, dE
dx0
i > 0. 
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